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PRIVACY LAW’S PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
PROBLEM 
Adam Thierer* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Privacy law today faces two interrelated problems.  The first is an information 
control problem.  Like so many other fields of modern cyberlaw—intellectual 
property, online safety, cybersecurity, etc.—privacy law is being challenged by 
intractable Information Age realities.1  Specifically, it is easier than ever before for 
information to circulate freely and harder than ever to bottle it up once it is 
released.2 
This has not slowed efforts to fashion new rules aimed at bottling up those 
information flows.  If anything, the pace of privacy-related regulatory proposals 
has been steadily increasing in recent years even as these information control 
challenges multiply.3  
This has led to privacy law’s second major problem: the precautionary 
principle problem. The precautionary principle generally holds that new 
innovations should be curbed or even forbidden until they are proven safe.  
Fashioning privacy rules based on precautionary principle reasoning necessitates 
prophylactic regulation that makes new forms of digital innovation guilty until 
proven innocent.  
This puts privacy law on a collision course with the general freedom to 
innovate that has thus far powered the Internet revolution, and privacy law 
threatens to limit innovations consumers have come to expect or even raise prices 
for services consumers currently receive free of charge.4  As a result, even if new 
regulations are pursued or imposed, there will likely be formidable push-back not 
just from affected industries but also from their consumers.  
In light of both these information control and precautionary principle 
problems, new approaches to privacy protection are necessary.  We need to invert 
the process of how we go about protecting privacy by focusing more on practical 
“bottom-up” solutions—education, empowerment, public and media pressure, 
social norms and etiquette, industry self-regulation and best practices, and an 
enhanced role for privacy professionals within organizations—instead of “top-
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 1. Adam Thierer, Copyright, Privacy, Property Rights & Information Control: Common Themes, 
Common Challenges, TECH. LIBERATION FRONT (Apr. 10, 2012), http://techliberation.com/2012/ 
04/10/copyright-privacy-property-rights-information-control. 
 2. Adam Thierer, When It Comes to Information Control, Everybody Has a Pet Issue & Everyone 
Will Be Disappointed, TECH. LIBERATION FRONT (Apr. 29, 2011), http://techliberation.com/2011/04/ 
29/when-it-comes-to-information-control-everybody-has-a-pet-issue-everyone-will-be-disappointed. 
 3. See Kate Kaye, Privacy Bills: Which One Would Ad Industry Choose? CLICKZ (May 18, 2011), 
http://www.clickz.com/clickz/news/2072092/privacy-bills-industry-choose. 
 4. ADAM THIERER, PERMISSIONLESS INNOVATION: THE CONTINUING CASE FOR COMPREHENSIVE 
TECHNOLOGICAL FREEDOM (Arlington, VA: Mercatus Ctr. at George Mason Univ., forthcoming 2014). 
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down” legalistic solutions and regulatory techno-fixes.5  Resources expended on 
top-down regulatory pursuits should instead be put into bottom-up efforts to help 
citizens better prepare for an uncertain future.  
In this regard, policymakers can draw important lessons from the debate over 
how best to protect children from objectionable online content.  In a sense, there is 
nothing new under the sun; the current debate over privacy protection has many 
parallels with earlier debates about how best to protect online child safety.  Most 
notably, just as top-down regulatory constraints came to be viewed as 
constitutionally-suspect and economically inefficient, and also highly unlikely to 
even be workable in the long-run for protecting online child safety, the same will 
likely be true for most privacy related regulatory enactments.   
This article sketches out some general lessons from those online safety debates 
and discusses their implications for privacy policy going forward.  
II. DEALING WITH NEW REALITIES 
Lawmakers and policy advocates who worry about how best to protect online 
privacy today must contend with the fact that, for better or worse, we now live in a 
world that is ruthlessly governed by two famous Internet aphorisms.6  First, 
“information wants to be free.”7 Sometimes that fact is worth celebrating; other 
times not so much.  “Unfortunately,” notes computer scientist Ben Adida, 
“information replication doesn’t discriminate: your personal data, credit cards and 
medical problems alike, also want to be free.  Keeping it secret is really, really 
hard,” he correctly notes.8  
A second well-known Internet aphorism explains why this is the case: “The 
Net interprets censorship as damage and routes around it,” as Electronic Frontier 
Foundation co-founder John Gilmore once noted.9  Importantly, this insight applies 
to all classes of information and efforts to control information flows, including: 
copyright policy, cybersecurity, state secrets, pornography, hate speech, or even 
personal information.  In each case, the reality is always the same: any effort to 
control information flows will be resisted by many other forces or actors 
throughout the online ecosystem.  Moreover, once the genie is out of the bottle, it is 
incredibly hard to get it back in, and in most cases it is simply impossible. 
These two realities are the byproduct of the Internet’s decentralized, 
distributed nature; the unprecedented scale of modern networked communications; 
the combination of dramatic expansions in computing and processing power (also 
                                                                                                     
 5. Adam Thierer, Let’s Not Place All Our Eggs in the Do Not Track Basket, IAPP: PRIVACY 
PERSPS. (May 2, 2013), https://www.privacyassociation.org/privacy_perspectives/post/lets_not_place_ 
all_our_eggs_in_the_do_not_track_basket. 
 6. Adam Thierer, The Pursuit of Privacy in a World Where Information Control Is Failing, 36 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 409, 454 (2013). 
 7. Id. at 431. 
 8. Ben Adida, (Your) Information Wants to Be Free, BENLOG (Apr. 28, 2011), 
http://benlog.com/articles/2011/04/28/your-information-wants-to-be-free. 
 9. Philip Elmer-Dewitt, First Nation in Cyberspace, TIME, Dec. 6, 1993, available at 
http://www.chemie.fu-berlin.de/outerspace/internet-article.html (emphasis added). 
470 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:2 
known as “Moore’s Law”)10 alongside a steady drop in digital storage costs; and 
the rise of widespread Internet access and ubiquitous mobile devices and service.11  
Compounding matters further still—especially for efforts to protect privacy—
is the fact that we are our own worst enemies when it comes to information 
containment.  Ours is a world of unprecedented individual information sharing 
through user-generation of content and self-revelation of data.12  Moreover, 
decentralized peer-to-peer sharing and surveillance capabilities now exist that make 
it easier than ever for us to release information not only about ourselves but also 
about all those around us.13  Traditional information control mechanisms are being 
strained to the breaking point in this new environment.14  
Taken together, the combined effect of these factors should be abundantly 
clear: law will typically lag well behind both technological and social 
developments.  Technology lawyer and consultant Larry Downes has shown how 
lawmaking in the information age is inexorably governed by the “law of 
disruption” or the fact that “technology changes exponentially, but social, 
economic, and legal systems change incrementally.”15  This law is “a simple but 
unavoidable principle of modern life,” he said, and it will have profound 
implications for the way businesses, government, and culture evolve.  “As the gap 
between the old world and the new gets wider,” he argues, “conflicts between 
social, economic, political, and legal systems” will intensify and “nothing can stop 
the chaos that will follow.”16 
                                                                                                     
 10. “Moore’s Law” refers to a statement by Intel co-founder Gordon Moore regarding the rapid 
pace of semiconductor technology growth. Moore stated, “[t]he number of transistors and resistors on a 
chip doubles every 18 months.” Definition of Moore’s Law, PC MAG. ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/47229/moore-s-law (last visited Jan. 17, 2014). 
 11. I have discussed these factors and their impact on information control efforts at greater length 
elsewhere.  See, e.g., Thierer, supra note 6, at 424-35. 
 12. Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
1880, 1895 (2013) (“[P]eople appear to be sharing data with increasing frequency and magnitude. Most 
people are not opting out as companies gather and use data. They are exposing the intimate minutiae of 
their lives on sites like Facebook and Twitter.”); Jenna Wortham, Instagram Direct and the Fracturing 
of Privacy, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Dec. 17, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/ 
12/17/instagram-direct-and-the-evolution-of-privacy (“[P]eople spend the vast majority of their time 
talking to each other through a screen — and it is fun to have new and interesting ways to get in touch 
with them. At the same time, our notions of privacy are constantly evolving and in many cases, being 
eroded altogether. As a result, we’re learning how to cope by adapting ourselves and our sharing 
behavior by deciding which version of ourselves to present based on the number of people who will be 
able to see it.”). 
 13. Francesca Musiani, Privacy as Invisibility: Pervasive Surveillance and the Privatization of 
Peer-to-Peer Systems, 9 TRIPLEC 126, 138 (2011), available at http://www.academia.edu/1470476/ 
Privacy_as_Invisibility_Pervasive_Surveillance_and_the_Privatization_of_Peer-to-Peer_Systems. 
 14. Adam Thierer, Privacy as an Information Control Regime: The Challenges Ahead, TECH. 
LIBERATION FRONT (Nov. 13, 2010), http://techliberation.com/2010/11/13/privacy-as-an-information-
control-regime-the-challenges-ahead. 
 15. LARRY DOWNES, THE LAWS OF DISRUPTION: HARNESSING THE NEW FORCES THAT GOVERN 
LIFE AND BUSINESS IN THE DIGITAL AGE 2 (2009). 
 16. Id. at 2-3. In a similar sense, Andy Grove, former CEO of Intel, once reportedly said that 
“[h]igh tech runs three-times faster than normal businesses. And the government runs three-times slower 
than normal businesses. So we have a nine-times gap.” Lillian Cunningham, Google’s Eric Schmidt 
Expounds on His Senate Testimony, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2011, available at 
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III. THE PROBLEM WITH PRECAUTIONARY REGULATION17   
Despite these new realities, private advocates have stepped up their calls for 
legislative and regulatory action to address alleged privacy violations.18  Many of 
their well-intentioned proposals are premised on “precautionary principle” logic.  
That is, the privacy and data security-related proposals often rest on the 
precautionary assumption that “since every technology and technological advance 
could pose some theoretical danger or risk, public policies should prevent people 
from using innovations until their developers can prove that they won’t cause any 
harms.”19 
The problem with letting such precautionary thinking guide policy is that it 
poses a serious threat to technological progress, economic entrepreneurialism, 
social adaptation, and long-run prosperity.20  If public policy is guided at every turn 
by the precautionary principle, technological innovation is impossible because of 
fear of the unknown; hypothetical worst-case scenarios trump most other 
considerations.21  Social learning and economic opportunities become far less 
likely, perhaps even impossible, under such a regime.  Precautionary principle-
based reasoning also cuts against the grain of the “permissionless innovation” ethos 
that has thus far powered the Internet and digital innovation.22  “In practical terms, 
therefore, precautionary principle-based regulation means fewer services, lower 
quality goods, higher prices, diminished economic growth, and a decline in the 
overall standard of living.”23  Moreover, as will be discussed further below, 
precautionary principle-based regulation also can take on a paternalistic cast when 
it denies individuals the right to freely exercise their preferred choices in either 
economic or social circumstances. 
                                                                                                     
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/on-leadership/googles-eric-schmidt-expounds-on-his-senate-
testimony/2011/09/30/gIQAPyVgCL_story.html. 
 17. Section III is adapted from: ADAM THIERER, PERMISSIONLESS INNOVATION: THE CONTINUING 
CASE FOR COMPREHENSIVE TECHNOLOGICAL FREEDOM, (Arlington, VA: Mercatus Center at George 
Mason University, 2014); Adam Thierer, Edith Ramirez’s ‘Big Data’ Speech: Privacy Concerns Prompt 
Precautionary Principle Thinking, TECH. LIBERATION FRONT (Aug. 29, 2013), 
http://techliberation.com/2013/08/29/edith-ramirezs-big-data-speech-privacy-concerns-prompt-
precautionary-principle-thinking.  See also Adam Thierer, A Framework for Benefit-Cost Analysis in 
Digital Privacy Debates, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1055, 1066-69 (2013). 
 18. Natasha Singer, An American Quilt of Privacy Laws, Incomplete, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2013, at 
BU1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/31/technology/in-privacy-laws-an-incomplete-
american-quilt.html (quoting Leslie Harris, President of the Center for Democracy and Technology, as 
stating: “We’ve been trying to get a comprehensive privacy law for over a decade, a law that would 
work for today and for technologies that we have not yet envisioned.”). 
 19. Adam Thierer, Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology 
Precautionary Principle, 14 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 309, 353 (2013).  
 20. Jonathan H. Adler, The Problems with Precaution: A Principle without Principle, THE 
AMERICAN (May 25, 2011), http://www.american.com/archive/2011/may/the-problems-with-
precaution-a-principle-without-principle. 
 21. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 24-34 
(2005).  
 22. Eli Dourado, ‘Permissionless Innovation’ Offline as Well as On, THE UMLAUT (Feb. 6, 2013), 
http://theumlaut.com/2013/02/06/permissionless-innovation-offline-as-well-as-on.  
 23. Adam Thierer, Who Really Believes in “Permissionless Innovation”? TECH. LIBERATION 
FRONT, Mar. 4, 2013, http://techliberation.com/2013/03/04/who-really-believes-in-permissionless-
innovation. 
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Yet, precautionary logic regularly guides privacy-related proposals. For 
example, Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Chairwoman Edith Ramirez has 
recently focused her attention on privacy and security fears about the growth of 
“big data.”24  Ramirez claimed that “[o]ne risk is that the lure of ‘big data’ leads to 
the indiscriminate collection of personal information,” and she continued on to 
argue: 
The indiscriminate collection of data violates the First Commandment of data 
hygiene: Thou shall not collect and hold onto personal information unnecessary to 
an identified purpose.  Keeping data on the off-chance that it might prove useful is 
not consistent with privacy best practices.  And remember, not all data is created 
equally.  Just as there is low quality iron ore and coal, there is low quality, 
unreliable data. And old data is of little value.25 
“Information that is not collected in the first place can’t be misused,” she 
claimed, and she also outlined hypothetical worst-case scenarios that might come 
about if such data collection was allowed at all.26   She is particularly concerned 
that all this data might somehow be used by companies to discriminate against 
certain classes of customers.  
Ramirez’s complaint is closely related to a concern voiced by some legal 
scholars today regarding what Ryan Calo calls “digital market manipulation,” or 
the belief that, “[f]irms will increasingly be able to trigger irrationality or 
vulnerability in consumers—leading to actual and perceived harms that challenge 
the limits of consumer protection law, but which regulators can scarcely ignore.”27  
Other scholars fear “power asymmetries” between companies and consumers and 
even suggest that consumers’ apparent lack of concern about sharing information 
means that people may not be acting in their own best self-interest when it comes 
to online safety and digital privacy choices.28  
Similarly, Siva Vaidhyanathan claims that consumers are being tricked by the 
                                                                                                     
 24. Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Keynote Address at the Technology Policy 
Institute Aspen Forum: The Privacy Challenges of Big Data: A View from the Lifeguard’s Chair 1 
(Aug. 19, 2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/ramirez/130819bigdataaspen.pdf. 
 25. Id. at 4.  
 26. Id. at 6.  
 27. Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) 
(manuscript at 5), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2309703; see also, 
David Talbot, Data Discrimination Means the Poor May Experience a Different Internet, MIT TECH. 
REV. (Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/520131/data-discrimination-means-the-
poor-may-experience-a-different-internet. 
 28. See Mark MacCarthy, New Directions in Privacy: Disclosure, Unfairness and Externalities, 6 
I/S: J. L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 425, 443 (2011) (“The idea is that individual choice in this area would 
lead, in a piecemeal fashion, to the erosion of privacy protections that are the foundation of the 
democratic regime, which is the heart of our political system. Individuals are making an assessment—at 
least implicitly—of the advantages and disadvantages to them of sharing information. They are 
determining that information sharing is, on balance, a net gain for them. But the aggregate effect of 
these decisions is to erode the expectation of privacy and also the role of privacy in fostering self-
development, personhood, and other values that underlie the liberal way of life. In this way, individual 
choices are not sufficient to justify information practices that collectively undermine widely shared 
public values.” (footnote omitted)). 
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“smokescreen” of “free” online services and “freedom of choice.”29  Although he 
admits that no one is forced to use online services and that consumers are also able 
to opt-out of most of its services or data collection practices, Vaidhyanathan argues 
that “such choices mean very little” because “the design of the system rigs it in 
favor of the interests of the company and against the interests of users.”30  
“Celebrating freedom and user autonomy is one of the great rhetorical ploys of the 
global information economy,” he says.31  “We are conditioned to believe that 
having more choices—empty though they may be—is the very essence of human 
freedom.  But meaningful freedom implies real control over the conditions of one’s 
life.”32 
If imposed in the form of legal sanctions, such reasoning would open the door 
to almost boundless controls on the activities of both producers and consumers of 
digital services, potentially limiting future innovations in this space.  Moreover, it 
would lead to what Daniel J. Solove has referred to as privacy law’s “paternalism” 
problem.33  “Privacy regulation,” he notes, “risks becoming too paternalistic. 
Regulation that sidesteps consent denies people the freedom to make choices.  The 
end result is that either people have choices that are not meaningful or people are 
denied choices altogether.”34  To the extent preemptive regulations restrict user 
choices in this way, it seems to confirm Thomas Lenard and Paul Rubin’s claim 
that “many of the privacy advocates and writers on the subject do not trust the 
consumers for whom they purport to advocate.”35 
Consumer protection standards have traditionally depended on a clear showing 
of actual, not prospective or hypothetical, harm.36  In some cases, when the 
potential harm associated with a particular practice or technology is extreme and 
poses a direct threat to physical well-being, law has displaced the general 
presumption that ongoing experimentation and innovation should be allowed by 
default.37  However, these are extremely rare scenarios, at least as it pertains to 
privacy concerns under American law, and they mostly involved health and safety 
measures aimed at preemptively avoiding catastrophic harm to individual or 
environmental well-being.  In the vast majority of other cases, our culture has not 
accepted the paternalistic idea that law must “save us from ourselves” (i.e., our own 
                                                                                                     
 29. SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE GOOGLIZATION OF EVERYTHING (AND WHY WE SHOULD 
WORRY) 83 (2011). 
 30. Id. at 84. 
 31. Id. at 89. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Solove, supra note 12, at 1882.  
 34. Id. at 1894. 
 35. THOMAS M. LENARD & PAUL H. RUBIN, TECH. POLICY INST., THE BIG DATA REVOLUTION: 
PRIVACY CONSIDERATIONS 24 (Dec. 2013),  
http://www.techpolicyinstitute.org/files/lenard_rubin_thebigdatarevolutionprivacyconsiderations.pdf. 
 36. See Solove, supra note 12, at 1897. (“The law generally does not override consent, even with 
potentially dangerous activities. . . . As a general matter, the law refrains from restricting transactions 
that appear on the surface to be consensual, and the law will tolerate a substantial amount of 
manipulation and even coercion before it deems a transaction to be nonconsensual.”). 
 37. See Zachary Lees, Anticipated Harm, Precautionary Regulation, and Hydraulic Fracturing, 13 
VT. J. ENVTL. L. 575, 584-89 (2012) (summarizing how the precautionary principle has been applied in 
various environmental contexts where potential harm was presumed to be significant).  
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irrationality or mistakes).38 
But it is not just that precautionary principle-based logic rejects personal 
responsibility, it is that it ignores the costs of preemptive policy action.39  This is 
particularly true for highly subjective values like digital privacy.  As Solove notes, 
“the correct choices regarding privacy and data use are not always clear.  For 
example, although extensive self-exposure can have disastrous consequences, many 
people use social media successfully and productively.”40  
Unfortunately, as noted in the next section, many privacy scholars do not 
bother conducting a serious review of the potential costs of their regulatory 
proposals.  As a result, preemptive policy action is almost always the preferred 
remedy to any alleged harm.  “By limiting or conditioning the collection of 
information, regulators can limit market manipulation at the activity level,” Calo 
says.41  “We could imagine the government fashioning a rule—perhaps inadvisable 
for other reasons—that limits the collection of information about consumers in 
order to reduce asymmetries of information.”42  Ultimately, Professor Calo does 
not endorse such a rule, but the corresponding cost of such regulatory proposals 
must be taken into account.  If preemptive regulation slowed or ended certain 
information flows, it could, as noted below, stifle the provision of new and better 
services that consumers demand.43  
The views set forth by some of these scholars as well as Chairwoman Ramirez 
represent a rather succinct articulation of precautionary principle thinking as 
applied to modern data collection practices.  They are essentially claiming that—
because there are various privacy risks associated with data collection and 
aggregation—policymakers should consider preemptive and potentially restrictive 
approaches to the initial collection and aggregation of data. 
The problem with that logic should be fairly obvious, however, and as 
identified by the late political scientist and risk analysis expert Aaron Wildavsky, 
“if you can do nothing without knowing first how it will turn out, you cannot do 
anything at all.”44  Best case scenarios will never develop if we are gripped with 
fear by the worst cases scenarios and try to preemptively plan for them with policy 
interventions.  “‘Worst case’ assumptions can convert otherwise quite ordinary 
conditions . . . into disasters, provided only that the right juxtaposition of unlikely 
                                                                                                     
 38. See id. (“People make decisions all the time that are not in their best interests. People relinquish 
rights and take bad risks, and the law often does not stop them.”); Tom W. Bell, Free Speech, Strict 
Scrutiny, and Self-Help: How Technology Upgrades Constitutional Jurisprudence, 87 MINN. L. REV. 
743, 743 (2003) (“The state ought not to help those who can better help themselves.”); see also Thierer, 
A Framework for Benefit-Cost Analysis, supra note 17, at 1066-69. 
 39. J.R. SMITH & SIOBHAN MACDERMOTT, WIDE OPEN PRIVACY: STRATEGIES FOR THE DIGITAL 
LIFE 165-66 (2012) (“[A]t this point, the attempt to impose one-size-fits-all regulation on an as-yet-to-
be-fully-known Internet strikes us as impractical, ineffective, and quite possibly counterproductive to 
continued innovation.”). 
 40. Solove, supra note 12, at 1895. 
 41. Calo, supra note 27, at 38. 
 42. Id. 
 43. A Status Update on the Development of Voluntary Do-Not-Track Standards: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 113th Cong. (2013) (testimony of Adam Thierer; transcript 
made available by the Mercatus Center, George Mason University, at http://mercatus.org/sites/ 
default/files/Thierer_testimony_DNT_042313.pdf) [hereinafter Thierer Testimony]. 
 44. AARON WILDAVSKY, SEARCHING FOR SAFETY 38 (1988). 
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factors occur.”45  In other words, it will always be easy to string together some 
random anecdotes or stories and concoct horrific-sounding scenarios about the 
future that leave us searching for preemptive solutions to problems that have not 
even developed yet. 
For example, when Chairwoman Ramirez argues that “[i]nformation that is not 
collected in the first place can’t be misused,” that is undoubtedly true.46  However, 
it is equally true that information that is not collected at all is information that 
might have been used to provide us with the next “killer app” or the great gadget or 
digital service that we cannot currently contemplate but that some innovative 
entrepreneur might be looking to develop.  Likewise, claiming that “old data is of 
little value” and issuing the commandment that “[t]hou shall not collect and hold 
onto personal information unnecessary to an identified purpose” implies that she 
believes little good will come from serendipitous data discovery.47  Yet, the reality 
is that the cornucopia of innovative information options and opportunities users 
have at their disposal today was driven in large part by data collection, including 
personal data collection.48  Those innovations were not necessarily part of a firm’s 
initial design; many came about after the fact with the discovery of new and 
interesting things that could be done with data. 
Examples of after-the-fact data-driven innovations include many of the 
information services and digital technologies that consumers take for granted 
today, such as mobile traffic services, digital mapping technologies, spam and 
fraud detection tools, instant spell-checkers, and language translation tools.  As 
Viktor Mayer-Schonberger and Kenneth Cukier point out, “data’s value needs to be 
considered in terms of all the possible ways it can be employed in the future, not 
simply how it is used in the present.”49  “In the big-data age,” they note, “data is 
like a magical diamond mine that keeps on giving long after its principal value has 
been tapped.”50  If privacy law had been premised on Chairwoman Ramirez’s 
pronouncement that “keeping data on the off-chance that it might prove useful is 
not consistent with privacy best practices,” then many of these innovations might 
never have come about, and future data-driven innovations would need to be 
curtailed significantly.51  
It is useful to contrast Chairwoman Ramirez’s approach to these concerns with 
her fellow FTC Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen.  Commissioner Ohlhausen 
has noted that, “[t]he success of the Internet has in large part been driven by the 
freedom to experiment with different business models, the best of which have 
survived and thrived, even in the face of initial unfamiliarity and unease about the 
                                                                                                     
 45. Id. at 92. 
 46. Ramirez, supra note 24, at 6. 
 47. Id. at 4. 
 48. Farhad Manjoo, Do We Want an Erasable Internet?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 2013, 4:46 AM, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304773104579272723222788620 (“There is a 
good chance you love some of the many tech products that could only have come about because tech 
companies saved and analyzed your data.”). 
 49. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL 
TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 103 (2013). 
 50. Id. at 104.  
 51. Ramirez, supra note 24, at 4. 
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impact on consumers and competitors.”52  Commissioner Ohlhausen also makes 
another crucial point about why the precautionary mindset is problematic: 
regulator irrationality or regulatory ignorance.53  Myopically focusing on the 
supposed irrationality of consumers and their openness to persuasion or 
“manipulation” ignores the potential irrationality or ignorance of regulators who 
simply do not possess the requisite knowledge to perfectly plan for every 
conceivable outcome.54  This is particularly true for information technology 
markets, which generally evolve much more rapidly than other sectors, and 
especially more rapidly that law itself.55  That insight leads Commissioner 
Ohlhausen to issue a word of caution to her fellow regulators: 
It is thus vital that government officials, like myself, approach new technologies 
with a dose of regulatory humility, by working hard to educate ourselves and 
others about the innovation, understand its effects on consumers and the 
marketplace, identify benefits and likely harms, and, if harms do arise, consider 
whether existing laws and regulations are sufficient to address them, before 
assuming that new rules are required.56  
This again suggests that Commissioner Ohlhausen’s approach to technological 
innovation is consistent with the permissionless innovation approach that powered 
the first wave of Internet innovation, whereas Chairwoman Ramirez’s approach is 
based on precautionary principle reasoning.  This tension dominates almost all 
privacy debates today, even if it is not always on such vivid display as it is here.  
IV. TOWARD SERIOUS BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 
At some point the full range of costs associated with precautionary principle-
based regulatory proposals must be taken into account.  If policymakers conduct a 
careful benefit-cost analysis of various regulatory proposals—something that has 
been woefully lacking on the privacy front in recent years—they would find that 
many complex economic and social trade-offs are at work.57 Regulation is not a 
costless exercise and, as noted, there are reasons to doubt it will even be effective if 
pursued.   
Despite this, Obama administration officials and other congressional 
lawmakers who have proposed expanded privacy regulation have failed to fully 
grapple with the costs associated with such rules in recent reports and statements.58  
This is unfortunate since a blueprint already exists for how to do so.  In its 1980 
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Policy Statement on Unfairness,59 the FTC clarified for members of Congress how 
the agency interpreted and enforced its statutorily granted authority under Section 5 
of the Federal Trade Commission Act.60  Section 5 prohibits “unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”61  In its Policy Statement, the agency 
noted that, “[t]o justify a finding of unfairness the injury must satisfy three tests.  It 
must be substantial; it must not be outweighed by any countervailing benefits to 
consumers or competition that the practice produces; and it must be an injury that 
consumers themselves could not reasonably have avoided.”62  This “is essentially a 
cost-benefit test,” note two former FTC officials.63 
The Policy Statement also specified that “the injury must be substantial” and 
that “[t]he Commission is not concerned with trivial or merely speculative harms. . 
. . Emotional impact and other more subjective types of harm . . . will not ordinarily 
make a practice unfair.”64  Of course, measuring such harms is a highly subjective 
and controversial undertaking,65 which may explain why the FTC has not made a 
serious effort to weigh the relative costs and benefits of various regulatory 
proposals.66 
Regardless, the benefits associated with commercial data collection and data-
driven marketing and innovation are clear.67  In a study commissioned by the 
Direct Marketing Association, John Deighton and Peter Johnson found that data-
driven marketing added $156 billion in revenue to the U.S. economy and fueled 
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more than 675,000 jobs in 2012.68  Major reports from consultancies Gartner69 and 
McKinsey Global Institute70 have also documented significant consumer benefits 
from “big data” across multiple sectors.  
Meanwhile, commercial data collection allows better targeting of advertising 
and marketing that produces significant benefits for consumers.71  Howard Beales, 
former director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection at the FTC, found that “the 
price of [behaviorally targeted] advertising in 2009 was 2.68 times the price of run 
of network advertising,” and this increased return on investment is important 
because it creates “greater utility for consumers [from more relevant 
advertisements] and clear appeal for advertisers” because of the increased 
conversion of ads into sales.72  This helps the creators of digital content and 
services continue to make cheap or even free goods available to consumers.73  If 
privacy regulation made such services more expensive or led them to disappear 
entirely, a consumer backlash would likely ensue.74  Importantly, firms would 
likely be able to use incentives to opt back in to various types of tracking and data 
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collection schemes even if privacy law was adjusted to make that more difficult.75  
Finally, privacy regulation could have a profound impact on market dynamics 
and the competitiveness of U.S. firms both domestically and internationally.76  
These impacts must also be taken into account when conducting benefit-cost 
analysis of new legislative or regulatory enactments since they could limit 
consumer choices or raise costs.  
V. NEW APPROACHES 
In light of the myriad new challenges associated with information control 
efforts as well as the costs associated with precautionary principle-based regulatory 
efforts, new approaches to privacy protection will need to be considered.  We can 
find some of those alternative approaches by examining the debate that has taken 
place about online child protection over the past fifteen years.77  
Since the dawn of the commercial Internet in the early 1990s, online safety and 
access to objectionable content—especially underage access to pornography—has 
been a major public policy concern. As a result, a wide variety of regulatory 
schemes and technical solutions were proposed.  Yet, those efforts were largely 
abandoned over time as policymakers and online safety advocates came to realize 
that legal hurdles and practical realities meant a new approach to dealing with 
access to objectionable online content was needed.  
Between 2000 and 2010, six major online safety task forces were formed to 
study online concerns and to consider possible solutions.78  The United States 
government convened three of these task forces, and they issued reports in 2000,79 
2002,80 and 2010 respectively.81  The British government formed another task force 
in 2007, which issued a report in March 2008.82  Finally, two additional task forces 
were formed in the U.S. in 2008 and concluded their work, respectively, in 
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December of 200883 and July of 2009.84  
Hundreds of experts submitted material to these task forces or testified before 
them.85  There was a great deal of unanimity among these task forces in terms of 
their conclusions and recommendations.  Most notably, the commissions all 
generally agreed that there is no single “silver-bullet” technological solution or 
legal quick-fix to concerns about online safety or access to objectionable content.86  
The rapid pace of technological change was a primary factor that these task forces 
cited when drawing this conclusion.87  
Each of the task forces concluded that education should be the primary 
solution to most online child safety concerns.88  Specifically, these task forces 
consistently stressed the importance of media literacy, awareness-building efforts, 
public service announcements, targeted intervention techniques, and better 
mentoring and parenting strategies.89 
As part of these efforts to strive for “digital citizenship,” online safety experts 
stressed the vital importance of teaching both children and adults smarter online 
hygiene (sensible personal data use) and “netiquette” (proper behavior toward 
others), which can further both online safety and digital privacy goals.90  More 
generally, as part of these digital literacy and citizenship efforts, more should be 
done to explain the potential perils of over-sharing information about ourselves and 
others while simultaneously encouraging consumers to delete unnecessary online 
information occasionally and cover their digital footprints in other ways. 
These education and literacy efforts are also important because they help us 
adapt to new technological changes by employing a variety of coping mechanisms 
or new social norms.  These efforts and lessons should start at a young age and 
continue on well into adulthood through other means, such as awareness campaigns 
and public service announcements. 
The importance of empowerment and user “self-help” is another lesson that 
flows from recent online safety discussions.  All the major online safety task forces 
that met over the past fifteen years recommended the use of technological self-help 
tools that could help users tailor online experiences to their own preferences and 
values.91  A wide variety of online safety- and privacy-enhancing tools already 
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exist for those looking to safeguard their child’s online experiences or their own 
online privacy.92  A host of tools are available to block or limit various types of 
data collection, and every major web browser has cookie-control tools to help users 
manage data collection.93  Many nonprofits—including many privacy advocates—
offer instructional websites and videos explaining how privacy-sensitive consumers 
can take steps to protect their personal information online.94 
Taken together, these lessons suggest a “layered approach” for enhancing both 
online safety and privacy protection.  This layered approach relies on using many 
tools, methods, and strategies; it implicitly assumes that law will always be one 
step behind in attempting to remedy these concerns, and hence, these alternative 
methods will need to fill the gap.  
Governments can play a major role in this process by facilitating educational 
and empowerment-based solutions.95  Governments are uniquely positioned to get 
the word out about new technologies—both the benefits and dangers—and can 
develop privacy and safety messaging—especially to youngsters—about 
appropriate use of new technologies.  The FTC already does so. Along with over a 
dozen other federal agencies, it runs a website called “OnGuard Online,” which 
addresses various online threats and offers the public helpful advice to combat 
them.96  In theory, government agencies could even go further and create privacy 
and safety-related apps that help users better protect themselves or their families 
online.  Of course, an extensive array of privacy and safety-enhancing 
empowerment tools already exists.97  
Beyond classroom media literacy and digital citizenship efforts, government 
can undertake broad-based public awareness campaigns.98  Government officials at 
the federal, state, and local levels should work together to devise media literacy 
campaigns focused on online safety, understanding the existing rating systems, and 
how to use parental controls. These campaigns should include broadcast (radio and 
TV) ads, Internet websites and advertising, and promotional posters and brochures 
that could be distributed at schools and government institutions.  Government has 
undertaken (or lent its support to) such public awareness campaigns to address 
other concerns in the past and had a great deal of success, including forest fire 
prevention (“Smokey the Bear”);99 anti-littering (“Give a Hoot, Don’t Pollute”);100 
                                                                                                     
 92. See Thierer, supra note 6, at 440-46. 
 93. See id. 
 94. See id. at 439. 
 95. See ONLINE SAFETY & TECH. WORKING GRP., supra note 78, at 31 (“There needs to be ongoing 
communications and interaction among all departments involved in Internet safety and education 
including Education, Justice, Homeland Security, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration (SAMHSA), Centers for Disease Control, Commerce, the FCC, the FTC and the White 
House with liaisons to Congress and state and local agencies.”). 
 96. See About Us, ONGUARD ONLINE, http://www.onguardonline.gov/about-us (last visited Jan. 27, 
2014). 
 97. See THIERER, supra note 77, at 103-43.  
 98. See ONLINE SAFETY & TECH. WORKING GRP., supra note 78, at 32 (“The government can’t 
legislate civility, but it can encourage it. This will not be an easy fix but, like cutting down on smoking, 
racism, sexism and other social ills, it can be accomplished through awareness-raising over time.”). 
 99. See Campaign History, SMOKEY BEAR, http://www.smokeybear.com/vault/history_main.asp 
(last visited Jan. 31, 2014). 
482 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:2 
crime prevention (“McGruff the Crime Dog”);101 and seat-belt safety.102  These and 
similar initiatives have helped change public attitudes toward important social 
matters without heavy-handed and expensive top-down controls being imposed on 
business models or innovations.  
VI. THE ROLE OF PRIVACY PROFESSIONALS AND THE DIGITAL  
DESIGNERS OF THE FUTURE 
Education and digital citizenship efforts are essential not only because they 
teach consumers how to navigate new information environments and challenges but 
also because they can guide the actions of current or future producers of new 
digital technologies.  
Much effort has been spent in recent years encouraging digital innovators to 
institute “privacy by design” when contemplating their new products.103  But real 
privacy by design should be a state of mind and a continuous habit of action that 
influences how designers think about the impact of their products and services 
before and after creation.  We should continue to consider how we might achieve 
“privacy by design” before new services are rolled out, but the reality is that 
“privacy on the fly” may become even more essential.  
This is where the role of privacy professionals—Chief Privacy Officers, Chief 
Information Officers, Chief Data Officers, “Data Architects,” etc.—becomes 
vital.104  Solove notes that Chief Privacy Officers and other privacy professionals 
“educate personnel to be mindful of privacy and influence software, product, and 
service design to be more privacy friendly.  Privacy self-management thus has the 
salutary effect of creating beneficial structural privacy protections and 
accountability inside institutions.”105  The steadily growing ranks of the 
International Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP), which trains and 
certifies privacy professionals, reflects the expanded focus on privacy and security 
by design efforts.  Membership in the IAPP has grown to more than 15,000, up 
from 10,000 in March 2012.106 
The rise of the privacy professional could have a profound impact on privacy 
protection in the future.  As Deirdre Mulligan and Kenneth Bamberger have noted, 
it is increasingly what happens “on the ground”—the day-to-day management of 
privacy decisions through the interaction of privacy professionals, engineers, 
outside experts, and regular users—that is really important for protecting 
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consumers’ privacy.  They suggest that “governing privacy through flexible 
principles” may be the best regulatory approach.107  In this way, privacy policy can 
again draw lessons from the online safety field where “bottom-up” safety-by-
design and safety-on-the-fly efforts have been underway for many years.  
VII. RELIANCE ON NORMS AND SOCIAL PRESSURE WILL EXPAND 
Another lesson that flows from the field of online child safety is that norms 
will play a greater role over time. Social pressure and private norms of acceptable 
use often act as “regulators” of the uses (and misuses) of new technologies.  This 
has been true long before the Internet and digital technologies began raising 
privacy concerns.  
The rise of the camera and public photography, for example, led to an initial 
backlash among some critics on privacy grounds.  Notably, in response to the 
privacy-related concerns about photography, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. 
Brandeis penned the most important essay ever written on privacy law, their 1890 
Harvard Law Review essay on “The Right to Privacy” claiming that 
“[i]nstantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred 
precincts of private and domestic life.”108  However, public attitudes toward 
cameras and public photography evolved quite rapidly, and they became an 
ingrained part of the human experience.  At the same time, social norms and 
etiquette evolved to address those who would use cameras in inappropriate or 
intrusive ways.  This holds true for modern technology.  Using smartphone cameras 
in gym locker rooms, for example, is frowned upon not just by gym management 
(which often posts notices restricting use) but also by patrons.109  Social constraints 
on mobile phones also constrain their uses in other public establishments and 
settings, such as in movie theaters, fancy restaurants, and “quiet cars” on trains. 
These norms or social constraints are purely bottom-up and group-driven.  
Norms are also influenced by the social pressure exerted by advocacy 
organizations. Media watchdogs and online safety groups have been quite 
successful in shaping media norms over the past two decades.  Groups like 
Common Sense Media have influenced content decisions through the pressure they 
have brought to bear on media providers in the marketplace.  Common Sense 
Media not only encouraged and influenced the development of private content 
rating systems for video games, but the group also developed its own content rating 
system for games, TV, and movies to provide parents and others with useful 
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information.110  Similarly, the Parents Television Council (PTC) awards a “seal of 
approval” to advertisers and programmers that only support programs that the PTC 
classifies as family-friendly.111   The organization also encourages parents to send 
letters and e-mails to advertisers who support programming they find objectionable 
and encourage those advertisers to end their support of those shows.112 
In recent years, privacy advocates have also become more visible and gained 
influence that closely mirrors what occurred with online child safety organizations 
in the previous two decades.  While both sets of advocates were slow to gain 
influence at first, as their respective issues gained more prominence, their power 
steadily grew.  Many other non-profit and advocacy organizations—including the 
Electronic Privacy Information Center,113 the Future of Privacy Forum,114 Privacy 
Rights Clearinghouse,115 ACLU,116 and others—have developed websites and 
materials to better inform consumers about how they can protect their data.  Going 
forward, we can expect privacy policies—both legal enactments and informal 
corporate standards—to be significantly influenced by the pressure that these 
advocates exert on the process. 
Finally, the media offers a powerful check on mistakes and misbehavior.  
Technology developers today face near constant scrutiny, not just from large media 
outlets, but also from what Dan Gillmor refers to as the rise of the “we-dia” (user-
generated content and citizen journalism) that is an increasingly important part of 
the modern media landscape.117  Gillmor, a former San Jose Mercury News 
columnist, asserts that we are in the middle of “a modern revolution . . . because 
technology has given us a communications toolkit that allows anyone [to] become a 
journalist at little cost and, in theory, with global reach.  Nothing like this has ever 
been remotely possible before.”118  “We are seeing the emergence of new, 
decentralized approaches to fulfilling the watchdog function and to engaging in 
political debate and organization,” notes Yochai Benkler.119 
Consider how public and media pressure forced both Instagram and Twitter to 
make almost immediate about-faces after changing privacy settings.  On December 
17, 2012, Instagram, an online photo sharing service owned by Facebook, 
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announced it would be changing its policies and making it easier for the company 
to share user information and photographs with Facebook and advertisers.120  The 
change prompted an intense user backlash and widespread media coverage.121  
Other photo-sharing applications saw a boost in traffic following Instagram’s 
debacle.122  Three days later, Instagram reversed its decision and reverted to its 
previous privacy policy.123  The company’s co-founder also issued a public apology 
on Instagram’s corporate blog.124  
A year later, on December 12, 2013, the microblogging service Twitter was 
forced to immediately reverse its decision to change the way users could block 
others on the site.125  “The brief change set off an uproar among users who said it 
opened the door for abusive behavior,” since it meant that blocked users “could 
view and send tweets to the person who blocked them, but those tweets would have 
been invisible to that person.”126  Following the backlash, Twitter reversed its 
decision and reinstated its former blocking policy just a few hours later.127  
These examples show how the combination of social norms, media attention, 
and public pressure provides a powerful check on abuses of new technologies and 
proves that new technologies can be regulated by more than law.  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Although policymakers will likely continue to pursue law and regulation and, 
at the margin, may be able to help with egregious privacy and security harms, the 
reality is that, outside narrow exceptions such as health and financial privacy 
regulation, the case for regulatory controls becomes harder to justify since the costs 
will typically exceed the benefits.  To the extent greater information controls are 
pursued, the burden of proof lies with advocates of precautionary principle-based 
regulation to demonstrate unambiguous harms are omnipresent and unavoidable 
absent prophylactic constraints.  Even then, benefit-cost analysis is essential.  
Regardless, it is essential to have a good backup plan when privacy controls 
are impossible or too costly.  Education is the strategy with the most lasting impact.  
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Media literacy and digital literacy provide skills and wisdom that can last a 
lifetime, enhancing individual resiliency.  Specifically, education can help teach 
both children and adults how to behave in, or respond to, a wide variety of 
situations.  Rethinking privacy from the bottom-up and engaging citizens in this 
way will ultimately serve us better than most of the top-down legalistic approaches 
being pursued today. 
